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Abstract
Studying complexity of various bribery problems has been one of the main research focus in compu-
tational social choice. In all the models of bribery studied so far, the briber has to pay every voter some
amount of money depending on what the briber wants the voter to report and the briber has some budget
at her disposal. Although these models successfully capture many real world applications, in many other
scenarios, the voters may be unwilling to deviate too much from their true preferences. In this paper, we
study the computational complexity of the problem of finding a preference profile which is as close to the
true preference profile as possible and still achieves the briber’s goal subject to budget constraints. We call
this problem LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED $BRIBERY. We consider three important measures of distances,
namely, swap distance, footrule distance, and maximum displacement distance, and resolve the complexity
of the optimal bribery problem for many common voting rules. We show that the problem is polynomial
time solvable for the plurality and veto voting rules for all the three measures of distance. On the other
hand, we prove that the problem is NP-complete for a class of scoring rules which includes the Borda voting
rule, maximin, Copelandα for any α ∈ [0, 1], and Bucklin voting rules for all the three measures of distance
even when the distance allowed per voter is 1 for the swap and maximum displacement distances and 2 for
the footrule distance even without the budget constraints (which corresponds to having an infinite budget).
For the k-approval voting rule for any constant k > 1 and the simplified Bucklin voting rule, we show that
the problem is NP-complete for the swap distance even when the distance allowed is 2 and for the footrule
distance even when the distance allowed is 4 even without the budget constraints. We complement these
hardness results by showing that the problem for the k-approval and simplified Bucklin voting rules is poly-
nomial time solvable for the swap distance if the distance allowed is 1 and for the footrule distance if the
distance allowed is at most 3. For the k-approval voting rule for the maximum displacement distance for
any constant k > 1, and for the simplified Bucklin voting rule for the maximum displacement distance, we
show that the problem is NP-complete (with the budget constraints) and, without the budget constraints,
they are polynomial time solvable.
1 Introduction
Aggregating preferences of a set of agents over a set of alternatives is a fundamental problem in many appli-
cations both in real life and artificial intelligence. Voting has often served as a natural tool for aggregating
preferences in such applications. Pioneering use of voting in key applications of artificial intelligence in-
cludes spam detection [CSS99], collaborative filtering [PHG00], etc. A typical voting setting consists of a set
of alternatives, a set of agents each having a preference which is a complete order over the alternatives, and
a voting rule which declares one or more alternatives as the winner(s) of the election.
However any such election scenario is susceptible to control attacks of various kinds – internal or external
agents may try to influence the election system in someone’s favor. One such attack which has been studied
extensively in computational social choice is bribery. In every model of bribery studied so far (see [FR16]),
we have the preferences of a set of voters, an external agent called briber with some budget, a bribing
model which dictates how much one has to bribe any voter to persuade her to cast a vote of briber’s choice,
and the computational problem is to check whether it is possible to bribe the voters subject to the budget
constraint so that some alternative of briber’s choice becomes the winner. This models not only serve as
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Voting rule
Distance Metric
Swap Footrule Maximum displacement
Plurality
⋆P [Theorem 3]
Veto
k-approval
⋆P for δ = 1 [Theorem 4]
NP-complete for δ = 2 [Theorem 9]
⋆P for δ 6 3 [Theorem 4]
NP-complete for δ = 4 [Theorem 9]
P [Theorem 5], ⋆P for δi = 1, ∀i [Theorem 4]
⋆
NP-complete for δi = 2, ∀i [Theorem 10]
Borda NP-complete for δ = 1 [Theorem 11] NP-complete for δ = 2 [Theorem 11] NP-complete for δ = 1 [Theorem 11]
Maximin NP-complete for δ = 1 [Theorem 14] NP-complete for δ = 2 [Theorem 14] NP-complete for δ = 1 [Theorem 14]
Copelandα,α ∈ [0, 1] NP-complete for δ = 1 [Theorem 15] NP-complete for δ = 2 [Theorem 15] NP-complete for δ = 1 [Theorem 15]
Simplified Bucklin
⋆P for δ = 1 [Theorem 6]
NP-complete for δ = 2 [Theorem 16]
⋆P for δ 6 3 [Theorem 6]
NP-complete for δ = 4 [Theorem 16]
P [Theorem 7], ⋆P for δi = 1, ∀i [Theorem 4]
⋆
NP-complete for δi = 2, ∀i [Theorem 17]
Bucklin NP-complete for δ = 1 [Theorem 18] NP-complete for δ = 2 [Theorem 18] NP-complete for δ = 1 [Theorem 18]
Table 1: The results marked ⋆ hold for the LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED $BRIBERY problem; others hold
for the LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY problem.
a true theoretical abstraction of various real world scenarios but also generalizes many other important
control attacks, for example, coalitional manipulation [BTT89, CSL07]. In this paper, we study a refinement
of the above bribery model motivated by the following important observation made by Obraztsova and
Elkind [OE12a, OE12b]
“...if voting is public (or if there is a risk of information leakage), and a voter’s preference is at
least somewhat known to her friends and colleagues, she may be worried that voting non-truthfully
can harm her reputation yet hope that she will not be caught if her vote is sufficiently similar to
her true ranking. Alternatively, a voter who is uncomfortable about manipulating an election for
ethical reasons may find a lie more palatable if it does not require her to re-order more than a few
candidates.”
Indeed, in the context of bribery, there can be situations where a voter may be bribed to report some
preference which “resembles” her true preference but a voter is simply unwilling to report any preference
which is far from her true preference. We remark that existing models of bribery do not capture the above
constraint since, intuitively speaking, the budget feasibility constraint in these models restricts the total
money spent (which is a global constraint) whereas the situations above demand (local) constraints per
voter. For example, let us think of a voter v with preference a ≻ b ≻ c. Suppose the voter v can be persuaded
to make at most two swaps and the cost of persuading her does not depend on the number of swaps she
performs in her preference. This could be the situation when she is happy to change her preference as briber
advises (simply because she trusts the briber that her change will finally ensure a better social outcome) but
does not wish to deviate from her own preference too much to avoid social embarrassment. One can see that
the classical model of bribery (SWAP BRIBERY for example) fails to capture the intricacies of this situation
(for example, making the cost per swap to be 0 fails because the voter v is not willing to cast c ≻ b ≻ a). In
this paper, we fill this research gap by proposing a bribery model which directly addresses these scenarios.
More specifically, we study the computational complexity of the following problem which we call LOCAL
DISTANCE CONSTRAINED $BRIBERY. Given preferences P = (≻i)i∈[n] of a set of agents, non-negative integers
(δi)i∈[n] denoting the distance change allowed for corresponding agents, non-negative integers (pi)i∈[n]
where pi denotes the amount one has to pay the voter i to change his or her preference, a non-negative
integer budget B, and an alternative c, compute if the preferences can be changed subject to the “price,
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distance, and budget constraints” so that c is a winner in the resulting election for some voting rule. We also
study an interesting special case of the LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED $BRIBERY problem where δi = δ for
some non-negative integer δ and pi = 0 for every i and B = 0; we call the latter problem LOCAL DISTANCE
CONSTRAINED BRIBERY. In this paper, we study the following commonly used distance functions on the
set of all possible preferences (permutations on the set of alternatives): (i) swap distance [Ken38], (ii)
footrule distance [Spe04], and (iii) maximum displacement distance [OE12a, OE12b]. The swap distance
(aka Kendall Tau distance, bubble sort distance, etc.) between two preferences is the number of pairs
of alternatives which are ranked in different order in these two preferences. Whereas the footrule distance
(maximum displacement distance respectively) between two preferences is the sum (maximum respectively)
of the absolute value of the differences of the positions of every alternative in two preferences. We refer to
Section 2 for formal definitions of the problems and the distance functions above.
1.1 Contribution
We study the computational complexity of the LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED $BRIBERY and LOCAL DISTANCE
CONSTRAINED BRIBERY problems for the plurality, veto, k-approval, a class of scoring rules which includes
the Borda voting rule [Theorem 12], maximin, Copelandα for any α ∈ [0, 1], Bucklin, and simplified Bucklin
voting rules for the swap, footrule, and maximum displacement distance. We summarize our results in
Table 1. We highlight that all our results are tight in the sense that we even find the exact value of δ till
which the LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY problem for some particular voting rule is polynomial time
solvable and beyond which it is NP-complete. As can be observed in Table 1, most of our NP-completeness
results (except Theorems 10 and 17 for which the corresponding LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY
problems are polynomial time solvable) hold even for the LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY problem
(and thus for the LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED $BRIBERY problem too) and even for small constant values
for δ. On the other hand, most of our polynomial time algorithms (except Theorems 4 and 7 for which the
corresponding LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED $BRIBERY problems are NP-complete) work for the general
LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED $BRIBERY problem (and thus for the LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY
problem too). We would like to highlight a curious case – for the maximum displacement distance, the LOCAL
DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY problem is polynomial time solvable for the simplified Bucklin voting rule
(for any δ) and NP-complete for the Bucklin voting rule even for δ = 1. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first instance where a natural problem is polynomial time solvable for the simplified Bucklin voting
rule and NP-complete for the Bucklin voting rule. We also observe that, unlike the optimal manipulation
problem in [OE12a, OE12b], the complexity of the LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY problem for some
common voting rule (k-approval with k > 1 and simplified Bucklin voting rules for example) can depend
significantly on the distance function under consideration.
1.2 Related Work
Faliszewski et al. [FHH06] propose the first bribery problem where the briber’s goal is to change a mini-
mum number of preferences to make some candidates win the election. Then they extend their basic model
to more sophisticated models of SHIFT BRIBERY and $BRIBERY [FHH09, FHHR09]. Elkind et al. [EFS09]
extend this model further and study the SWAP BRIBERY problem where there is a cost associated with ev-
ery swap of alternatives. Dey et al. [DMN17] show that the bribery problem remains intractable for many
common voting rules for an interesting special case which they call FRUGAL BRIBERY. The bribery problem
has also been studied in various other preference models, for example, truncated ballots [BFLR12], soft
constraints [PRV13], approval ballots [SFE17], campaigning in societies [FGKT18], CP-nets [DK16], com-
binatorial domains [MPVR12], iterative elections [MNRS18], committee selection [BFNT16], probabilistic
lobbying [BEF+14], etc. Erdelyi et al. [EHH14] study the bribery problem under voting rule uncertainty. Fal-
iszewski et al. [FRRS14] study bribery for the simplified Bucklin and the Fallback voting rules. Xia [Xia12],
and Kaczmarczyk and Faliszewski [KF16] study the destructive variant of bribery. Dorn and Schlotter [DS12]
and Bredereck et al. [BCF+14] explore parameterized complexity of various bribery problems. Chen et
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al. [CXX+18] provide novel mechanisms to protect elections from bribery. Knop et al. [KKM18] provide a
uniform framework for various control problems. Although most of the bribery problems are intractable,
few of them, SHIFT BRIBERY for example, have polynomial time approximation algorithms [EF10, KHH18].
Manipulation, a specialization of bribery, is another fundamental attack on election [CW16]. In the manipu-
lation problem, a set of voters (called manipulators) wants to cast their preferences in such a way that (when
tallied with the preferences of other preferences) makes some alternative win the election. Obraztsova and
Elkind [OE12a, OE12b] initiate the study of optimal manipulation in that context.
The rest of the paper has been organized as follows. We introduce our notation and formally define our
computational problems in Section 2; then we present our polynomial time algorithms and NP-completeness
results in respectively Section 3 and Section 4; we finally conclude with future research directions in Sec-
tion 5. A short version of our work will appear in [Dey19].
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Voting and Voting Rules
For a positive integer k, we denote the set {1, 2, . . . , k} by [k]. Let A = {ai : i ∈ [m]} be a set ofm alternatives.
A complete order over the set A of alternatives is called a preference. We denote the set of all possible
preferences over A by L(A). A tuple (≻i)i∈[n] ∈ L(A)
n of n preferences is called a profile. We say that an
alternative a ∈ A is placed at the ℓth position (from left or from top) in a preference ≻∈ L(A) for some
positive integer ℓ (and denote it by pos(a,≻)) if |{b ∈ A : b ≻ a}| = ℓ − 1. We say that the distance of two
alternatives a,b ∈ A in a preference ≻∈ L(A) is some positive integer k if there exists a positive integer ℓ
such that the positions of a and b in ≻ are either ℓ and ℓ + k respectively or ℓ + k and ℓ respectively. An
election E is a tuple (≻,A) where ≻ is a profile over a set A of alternatives. If not mentioned otherwise,
we denote the number of alternatives and the number of preferences by m and n respectively. A map
r : ⊎n,|A|∈N+L(A)
n −→ 2A \ {∅} is called a voting rule. Given an election E, we can construct from E a
directed weighted graph GE which is called the weighted majority graph of E. The set of vertices in GE is
the set of alternatives in E. For any two alternatives x and y, the weight of the edge (x,y) is DE(x,y) =
NE(x,y) − NE(y, x), where NE(a,b) is the number of preferences where the alternative a is preferred over
the alternative b for a,b ∈ A,a 6= b. Examples of some common voting rules are as follows.
⊲ Positional scoring rules: Anm-dimensional vector α = (α1,α2, . . . ,αm) ∈ Nm with α1 > α2 > . . . > αm
and α1 > αm for everym ∈ N naturally defines a voting rule — an alternative gets score αi from a preference
if it is placed at the ith position, and the score of an alternative is the sum of the scores it receives from all
the preferences. The winners are the alternatives with the maximum score. Scoring rules remain unchanged
if we multiply every αi by any constant λ > 0 and/or add any constant µ. Hence, we can assume without
loss of generality that for any score vector α, we have gcd((αi)i∈[m]) = 1 and there exists a j < m such that
αℓ = 0 for all ℓ > j. We call such an α a normalized score vector. For some k ∈ [m−1], if αi is 1 for i ∈ [k] and
0 otherwise, then, we get the k-approval voting rule. The k-approval voting rule is also called the (m−k)-veto
voting rule. The 1-approval voting rule is called the plurality voting rule and the (m − 1)-approval voting
rule is called the veto voting rule. If αi = m− i for every i ∈ [m], then we get the Borda voting rule.
⊲ Maximin: The maximin score of an alternative x is miny 6=xDE(x,y). The winners are the alternatives
with the maximum maximin score.
⊲ Copelandα: Given α ∈ [0, 1], the Copelandα score of an alternative x is |{y 6= x : DE(x,y) > 0}|+ α|{y 6=
x : DE(x,y) = 0}|. The winners are the alternatives with the maximum Copeland
α score.
⊲ Simplified Bucklin and Bucklin: The simplified Bucklin score of an alternative x is the minimum number
ℓ such that x is placed within the first ℓ positions in more than half of the preferences. The winners are the
alternatives with the lowest simplified Bucklin score. Let k be the minimum simplified Bucklin score of any
alternative. Then the Bucklin winners are the alternatives who appear the maximum number of times within
the first k positions.
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2.2 Distance Function
A distance function d takes two preferences on a set A of alternatives as input and outputs a non-negative
number which satisfies the following properties: (i) d(≻1,≻2) = 0 for ≻1,≻2∈ L(A) if and only if ≻1=≻2,
(ii) d(≻1,≻2) = d(≻2,≻1) for every ≻1,≻2∈ L(A), (iii) d(≻1,≻2) 6 d(≻1,≻3) + d(≻3,≻2) for every
≻1,≻2,≻3∈ L(A). We will consider the following distance functions in this paper.
⊲ Swap distance:
dswap(≻1,≻2) =
∣
∣{{a,b} ⊂ A : a ≻1 b,b ≻2 a}
∣
∣
⊲ Footrule distance:
dfootrule(≻1,≻2) =
∑
a∈A
∣
∣
∣pos(a,≻1) − pos(a,≻2)
∣
∣
∣
⊲ Maximum displacement distance:
dmax displacement(≻1,≻2) = max
a∈A
∣
∣
∣pos(a,≻1) − pos(a,≻2)
∣
∣
∣
It is well known that, for any two preferences ≻1,≻2∈ L(A), we have dswap(≻1,≻2) 6 dfootrule(≻1,≻2) 6
2dswap(≻1,≻2) [DG77]. Let r be any voting rule and d be any distance function on L(A). We now define our
computational problem formally for any distance function d on L(A).
Definition 1 (d-LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY). Given a set A of alternatives, a profile ≻= (≻i
)i∈[n] ∈ L(A)
n of n preferences, a positive integer δ, and an alternative c ∈ A, compute if there exists a profile
≻′= (≻′i)i∈[n] ∈ L(A)
n such that
(i) d(≻i,≻′i) 6 δ for every i ∈ [n]
(ii) r(≻′) = {c}
We denote an instance of LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY by (A,P, c, δ).
Definition 2 (d-LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED $BRIBERY). Given a set A of alternatives, a profile ≻= (≻i
)i∈[n] ∈ L(A)
n of n preferences, positive integers (δi)i∈[n] denoting distances allowed for every preference, non-
negative integers (pi)i∈[n] denoting the prices of every preference, a non-negative integerB denoting the budget of
the Briber, and an alternative c ∈ A, compute if there exists a subset J ⊆ [n] and a profile≻′= (≻′i)i∈J ∈ L(A)
|J|
such that
(i)
∑
i∈J pi 6 B
(ii) d(≻i,≻′i) 6 δi for every i ∈ J
(iii) r
(
(≻′i)i∈J, (≻i)i∈[n]\J
)
= {c}
We denote an instance of LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED $BRIBERY by (A,P, c, (δi)i∈[n], (pi)i∈[n]).
We remark that the optimal bribery problem, as described in Definition 1, demands the alternative c to
win uniquely. It is equally motivating to demand that c is a co-winner. As far as the optimal bribery problem
is concerned, we can easily verify that all our results, both algorithmic and hardness, extend easily to the
co-winner case. However, we note that it need not always be the case in general (see Section 1.1 in [XC11]
for example).
3 Polynomial Time Algorithms
In this section, we present our polynomial time algorithms. All our polynomial time algorithms are obtained
by reducing our problem to the maximum flow problem which is quite common in computational social
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choice (see for example [Fal08]). In the maximum flow problem, the input is a directed graph with two
special vertices s and t and (positive) capacity for every edge, and the goal is to compute the value of
maximum flow that can be sent from s to t subject to the capacity constraints of every edge. This problem
is known to have polynomial time algorithms. Moreover, it is also known that, if the capacity of every edge
is positive integer, then the value of maximum flow is also a positive integer, the flow in every edge is also a
non-negative integer, and such a maximum flow can be found in polynomial time [Cor09].
Theorem 3. The LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED $BRIBERY problem is polynomial time solvable for the plurality
and veto voting rules for the swap, footrule, and maximum displacement distance.
Proof. Let us first prove the result for the plurality voting rule. Let P = (≻i)i∈[n] be the input profile, and x
the distinguished alternative. Let the plurality score of any alternative a ∈ A in P be s(a). We first guess the
final score ℓx of x in the range s(x) to n. Let Q be the sub-profile of P consisting of preferences which do not
place x at their first position. For any preference ≻i∈ Q, we compute the set of alternatives Ai ⊆ A which
can be placed at the first position keeping the distance from ≻i at most δi. We observe that, for the swap and
maximum displacement distances, Ai is the set of alternatives which appear within the first δi + 1 positions
in ≻i; for the footrule distance, Ai is the set of alternatives which appear within the first ⌊δi/2⌋ positions in
≻i. We now create the following minimum cost flow network G with demand on edges. It is well known that
a minimum cost flow (of certain flow value) satisfying demands of all the edges can be found in polynomial
time (see for example [GTT90]).
V[G] = {ui :≻i∈ Q} ∪ {va : a ∈ A} ∪ {s, t}
E[G] = {(s,ui) :≻i∈ Q} ∪ {(va, t) : a ∈ A}
∪{(ui, va) :≻i∈ Q,a ∈ Ai}
capacity(vx, t) = ℓx − s(x); capacity(va, t) = ℓx − 1∀a ∈ A \ {x}
capacity of every other edge is 1
demand(vx, t) = ℓx − s(x);demand of every other edge is 0
cost(ui, va) = pi∀ ≻i∈ Q,a ∈ Ai,a does not appear
at the first position in ≻i; cost of other edges is 0
From the construction it follows that the input LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED $BRIBERY instance has a
successful bribery where the final plurality score of the alternative x is at least ℓx if and only if there is an
s − t flow in G of flow value |Q| with cost at most B. Since there are at most n possible values that ℓx can
take and we try all of them, the LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED $BRIBERY problem for the plurality voting
rule for the three distance functions is polynomial time solvable.
We now prove the result for the veto voting rule. We first guess the final veto score ℓx of x in the range 0
to n. For any preference ≻i∈ P, we compute the set of alternatives Ai ⊆ A which can be placed at the last
position keeping the distance from ≻i at most δi. We observe that, for all the three the distance functions
under consideration, Ai is the set of all alternatives which appear within the last δi positions in ≻i. We now
create the following minimum cost flow network G with demand on edges.
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V[G] = {ui :≻i∈ P} ∪ {va : a ∈ A} ∪ {s, t}
E[G] = {(s,ui) :≻i∈ P} ∪ {(va, t) : a ∈ A}
∪{(ui, va) :≻i∈ P,a ∈ Ai}
capacity(vx, t) = ℓx; capacity(va, t) = n∀a ∈ A \ {x};
capacity of every other edge is 1
demand(va, t) = ℓx∀a ∈ A \ {x};demand of every other edge is 0
cost(ui, va) = pi∀ ≻i∈ P,a ∈ Ai,a does not appear
at the last position in ≻i; cost of other edges is 0
From the construction it follows that the input LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED $BRIBERY instance has a
successful bribery where the final veto score of the alternative x is at most ℓx if and only if there is an s − t
flow in G of flow value |P| with cost at most B. Since there are at most n possible values that ℓx can take
and we try all of them, the LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED $BRIBERY problem for the veto voting rule for the
three distance functions is polynomial time solvable.
We prove the following results by reducing to the maximum flow problem.
Theorem 4.
Proof. The proof for the swap and maximum displacement distance is completely analogous to the proof of
Theorem 3. The second part of the statement follows from the following claim: for any two preferences
≻1,≻2∈ L(A), if dfootrule(≻1,≻2) 6 3, then dswap(≻1,≻2) 6 1. If dfootrule(≻1,≻2) = 2, then clearly dswap(≻1
,≻2) = 1. Now if, dfootrule(≻1,≻2) = 3, then dswap(≻1,≻2) > 1. However, if dswap(≻1,≻2) = 2, then, by
analyzing all the cases, dfootrule(≻1,≻2) = 4 which proves the claims.
Theorem 5. The LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY problem is polynomial time solvable for the k-
approval voting rule for the maximum displacement distance for any k.
Proof. Let P be the input profile and x the distinguished alternative. In every preference in P, if it is possible
to place x within the first k position, which happens exactly when x appears within the first k + δ positions
in a preference, we place x at the first position and keep the relative ordering of every other alternative
the same. Let P′ ⊆ P be the set of such preferences. Then the score of x in the resulting profile is |P′|; let
it be ℓx. For any preference ≻∈ P, we compute the set of alternatives A≻ ⊆ A for whom there exist two
preferences ≻1,≻2∈ L(A) with distance at most δ each from ≻ such that the alternative appears within the
first k positions in≻1 and it does not appear within the first k positions in≻2. We observe thatA≻ is precisely
the set of alternatives which appear in positions from max{1, k− δ} to min{k + δ,m}. Let δ′ = min{k, δ}. For
any alternative y ∈ A\{x}, let ℓy be the number of preferences in P where y appears within the first k−δ−1
positions. If there exists an alternative y ∈ A\{x} such that ℓy > ℓx, then we output NO. Otherwise we create
the following flow network G = (V,E, c, s, t): V = {u≻ :≻∈ P\P′}∪ {vy : y ∈ A\ {x}}∪ {s, t},E = {(s,u≻) :≻∈
P \ P′} ∪ {(vy, t) : y ∈ A \ {x}} ∪ {(u≻, vy) :≻∈ P \ P′,y ∈ A \ {x},y ∈ A≻}, c((vy, t)) = ℓx − 1 − ℓy∀(vy, t) ∈
E, c((s,u≻)) = δ
′ − 1∀(s,u≻) ∈ E,≻∈ P
′, c((s,u≻)) = δ
′∀(s,u≻) ∈ E,≻∈ P \ P
′, c(e) = 1 for every other
e ∈ E. From the construction it is clear that the input instance is a YES instance if and only if there is an
s − t flow in G of value
∑
≻∈P c((s,u≻)). Hence the LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY problem for
the k-approval voting rule for the maximum displacement distance reduces to the maximum flow problem
which proves the result.
Theorem 6.
Proof. The proof of the statement uses arguments analogous to the proof of Theorem 4.
Theorem 7. The LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY problem is polynomial time solvable for the simplified
Bucklin voting rule for the maximum displacement distance.
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4 Hardness Results
In this section, we present our hardness results. We use the following (3,B2)-SAT problem to prove our
hardness results which is known to be NP-complete [BKS03].
Definition 8 ((3,B2)-SAT). Given a set X = {xi : i ∈ [n]} of n variables and a set {Cj : j ∈ [m]} of m 3-CNF
clauses on X such that, for every i ∈ [n], xi and x¯i each appear in exactly 2 clauses, compute if there exists any
Boolean assignment to the variables which satisfy all the m clauses simultaneously.
We now present our hardness result for the k-approval voting rule for the swap and footrule distances.
In this section, δ always denotes the distance under consideration.
Theorem 9. The LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY problem is NP-complete for the k-approval voting
rule for any constant k > 2 for the swap distance even when δ = 2. Hence, the LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED
BRIBERY problem is NP-complete for the k-approval voting rule for any constant k > 2 for the footrule distance
even when δ = 4.
Proof. Let us present the proof for the 2–approval voting rule first. The LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED
BRIBERY problem for the 2-approval voting rule for the swap distance is clearly in NP. To prove NP-hardness,
we reduce from (3,B2)-SAT to LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY. Let (X = {xi : i ∈ [n]},C = {Cj :
j ∈ [m]}) be an arbitrary instance of (3,B2)-SAT. Let us assume without loss of generality that both n and m
are even integers; if not, we take disjoint union of the instance with itself which doubles both the number
of variables and the number of clauses. Let us consider the following instance (A,P, c, δ = 2) of LOCAL
DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY.
A = {a(xi, 0),a(xi, 1),a(x¯i, 0),a(x¯i, 1) : i ∈ [n]} ∪ {c,u}
∪ {wi, zi : i ∈ [n]} ∪ {yj,dj,d
′
j : j ∈ [m]}
We construct the profile P using the following function f. The function f takes a literal and a clause as
input, and outputs a value in {0, 1,−}. For each literal l, let Ci and Cj with 1 6 i < j 6 m be the two clauses
where l appears. We define f(l,Ci) = 0, f(l,Cj) = 1, and f(l,Ck) = − for every k ∈ [m] \ {i, j}. This finishes
the description of the function f. We now describe P. Let ∆ = 100m2n2.
(I) For every i ∈ [n], we have
⊲ wi ≻ a(xi, 0) ≻ a(xi, 1) ≻ zi ≻ others
⊲ wi ≻ a(x¯i, 0) ≻ a(x¯i, 1) ≻ zi ≻ others
(II) For every Cj = (l1 ∨ l2 ∨ l3), j ∈ [m], we have
⊲ yj ≻ dj ≻ a(l1, f(l1,Cj)) ≻ d′j ≻ others
⊲ yj ≻ dj ≻ a(l2, f(l2,Cj)) ≻ d′j ≻ others
⊲ yj ≻ dj ≻ a(l3, f(l3,Cj)) ≻ d′j ≻ others
(III) c ≻ d1 ≻ d2 ≻ d3 ≻ others
(IV) ∆+ 2 copies: u ≻ d1 ≻ d2 ≻ c ≻ others
(V) For every 1 6 i 6 n/2, we have
⊲ ∆+ 1 copies: u ≻ w2i−1 ≻ w2i ≻ d1 ≻ others
(VI) For every i ∈ [n]
⊲ ∆+ 1 copies: u ≻ a(xi, 1) ≻ a(x¯i, 1) ≻ d1 ≻ others
⊲ ∆+ 2 copies: u ≻ a(xi, 0) ≻ a(x¯i, 0) ≻ d1 ≻ others
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(VII) For every 1 6 i 6 m/2, we have
⊲ ∆ copies: u ≻ y2j−1 ≻ y2j ≻ d1 ≻ others
We claim that the two instances are equivalent. In one direction, let the (3,B2)-SAT instance be a YES
instance with a satisfying assignment g : X −→ {0, 1}. Let us consider the following profile Q where the swap
distance of every preference is at most 2 from its corresponding preference in P.
(I) For every i ∈ [n], we have
⊲ If g(xi) = 1, then
– wi ≻ zi ≻ a(xi, 0) ≻ a(xi, 1) ≻ others
– a(x¯i, 0) ≻ a(x¯i, 1) ≻ wi ≻ zi ≻ others
⊲ Else
– a(xi, 0) ≻ a(xi, 1) ≻ wi ≻ zi ≻ others
– wi ≻ zi ≻ a(x¯i, 0) ≻ a(x¯i, 1) ≻ others
(II) For every j ∈ [m], if Cj = (l1 ∨ l2 ∨ l3) and g makes l1 = 1 (we can assume by renaming), then we
have
⊲ dj ≻ a(l1, f(l1,Cj)) ≻ yj ≻ d′j ≻ others
⊲ yj ≻ dj ≻ a(l2, f(l2,Cj)) ≻ d′j ≻ others
⊲ yj ≻ dj ≻ a(l3, f(l3,Cj)) ≻ d′j ≻ others
(III) c ≻ d1 ≻ d2 ≻ d3 ≻ others
(IV) ∆+ 2 copies: u ≻ c ≻ d1 ≻ d2 ≻ others
(V) For every 1 6 i 6 n/2, we have
⊲ ∆+ 1 copies: w2i−1 ≻ w2i ≻ u ≻ d1 ≻ others
(VI) For every i ∈ [n]
⊲ ∆+ 1 copies: a(xi, 1) ≻ a(x¯i, 1) ≻ u ≻ d1 ≻ others
⊲ ∆+ 2 copies: a(xi, 0) ≻ a(x¯i, 0) ≻ u ≻ d1 ≻ others
(VII) For every 1 6 i 6 m/2, we have
⊲ ∆ copies: y2j−1 ≻ y2j ≻ u ≻ d1 ≻ others
The 2-approval score of every alternative from Q is given in Table 2. Hence, c wins uniquely in Q and
thus the LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY instance is a YES instance.
Alternatives Score
c ∆+ 3
wi, i ∈ [n],u,yj, j ∈ [m] ∆+ 2
a(xi, 0),a(xi, 1),a(x¯i, 0),a(x¯i, 1), i ∈ [n] 6 ∆+ 2
zi, i ∈ [n],dj,d′j, j ∈ [m] < ∆
Table 2: Summary of scores from Q
In the other direction, let us assume that there exists a profile Q such that the swap distance of every
preference in Q is at most 2 from its corresponding preference in P and c wins uniquely in Q. We can
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assume without loss of generality that c appears within the first 2 positions in every preference in Q which
corresponds to the preferences in Items (III) and (IV) in P. We now observe that, irrespective of other
preferences in Q, the score of c in Q is ∆ + 3. Also the score of u from the preferences corresponding to
Item (IV) in Q is already ∆ + 2. Hence, for c to win uniquely in Q, u must not appear within the first two
positions in any preference in Q which corresponds to the preferences in Items (V) to (VII) in P. This makes
the score of wi, i ∈ [n] ∆ + 1, the score of a(l, 0) ∆ + 2 and the score of a(l, 1) ∆+ 1 for every literal l, and
the score of yj, j ∈ [m] ∆ from the preferences corresponding to Items (III) to (VII) in Q. We now consider
the following assignment g : X −→ {0, 1} – for every i ∈ [n], g(xi) = 1 if the preference corresponding
to wi ≻ a(xi, 0) ≻ a(xi, 1) ≻ zi ≻ others in Q keeps wi within the first 2 positions; if the preference
corresponding to wi ≻ a(x¯i, 0) ≻ a(x¯i, 1) ≻ zi ≻ others in Q keeps wi within the first 2 positions, then we
define g(xi) = 0. We observe that the function g is well defined since wi must be pushed out of the first
2 positions at least once in the preferences corresponding to wi ≻ a(xi, 0) ≻ a(xi, 1) ≻ zi ≻ others and
wi ≻ a(x¯i, 0) ≻ a(x¯i, 1) ≻ zi ≻ others; otherwise the score of wi is the same as the score of c which is a
contradiction. We claim that g is a satisfying assignment for the (3,B2)-SAT instance. Suppose not, then let
us assume that g does not satisfy Cj = (l1 ∨ l2 ∨ l3) for some j ∈ [m]. It follows from the definition of g
that the score of every alternative in {a(li, f(li,Cj)) : i ∈ [3]} from the preferences corresponding to Items (I)
and (III) to (VII) in Q is already ∆ + 2. Hence yj can never be pushed out of the first 2 positions in the
preferences corresponding to Item (II) in Q. However this makes the score of yj ∆+ 3 in Q. This contradicts
our assumption that c is the unique winner in Q. Hence g is a satisfying assignment and thus the (3,B2)-SAT
instance is a YES instance.
Generalizations to k–approval for any constant k > 3 can be done by using 10m8n8 dummy candidates
and ensuring that any dummy alternative appears at most once within the first k+3 positions in the profile P.
The proof for the footrule distance follows from the observation that, for any two preferences≻1,≻2∈ L(A),
if we have dfootrule(≻1,≻2) = 4, then we have dswap(≻1,≻2) = 2.
Theorem 10. The LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED $BRIBERY problem is NP-complete for the k-approval voting
rule for the maximum displacement distances even when δi = 2 for every preference i for any constant k > 1.
Proof. Let us present the proof for the 2–approval voting rule first. The LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED
$BRIBERY problem for the 2-approval voting rule for the maximum displacement distance is clearly in NP. To
prove NP-hardness, we reduce from (3,B2)-SAT to LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED $BRIBERY. Let (X = {xi :
i ∈ [n]},C = {Cj : j ∈ [m]}) be an arbitrary instance of (3,B2)-SAT. Let us consider the following instance of
LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED $BRIBERY. The set of alternativesA is {ai, a¯i,bi, b¯i,wi,w
′
i : i ∈ [n]}∪{c}∪{yj :
j ∈ [m]}∪D, where |D| = 300m3n3. We now describe the preference profile P along with their corresponding
prices. The profile P is a disjoint union of two profiles, namely, P1 and P2. While describing the preferences
of P below, whenever we say ‘others’ or ‘for some alternatives in D’ or ‘for some subset of D’, the unspecified
alternatives are assumed to be arranged in such a way that, for every unspecified alternative a ∈ A \ D, at
least 10 alternatives from D appear immediately before a. We also ensure that any alternative in D appears
within top k + 10 positions at most once in P whereas every alternative in A \ D appears within top 10mn
position in every preference in P. This is always possible because |D| = 300m3n3 whereas |A\D| = 6n+m+1
and |P| 6 100(m + n). Let f and g be functions defined on the set of literals as f(xi) = ai,g(xi) = bi, and
f(x¯i) = a¯i,g(x¯i) = b¯i for every i ∈ [n]. We also define a function h as h(Cj, l) = f(l) if the literal l appears
in the clause Cj but l does not appear in any clause Cr for any 1 6 r < l, h(Cj, l) = g(l) if the literal l
appears in the clause Cj but l does not appear in any clause Cr for any l < r 6m, and − otherwise. We first
describe P1 below. The price of every preference in P1 is 1.
(I) For every i ∈ [n], we have the following preferences.
⊲ Dk−2 ≻ wi ≻ w′i ≻ ai ≻ bi ≻ others for some Dk−2 ⊆ D with |Dk−2| = k− 2
⊲ Dk−2 ≻ wi ≻ w′i ≻ a¯i ≻ b¯i ≻ others for some Dk−2 ⊆ D with |Dk−2| = k− 2
(II) For every Cj = (l1 ∨ l2 ∨ l3) with j ∈ [m], we have the following preferences.
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⊲ Dk−2 ≻ d ≻ yj ≻ h(Cj, l1) ≻ d′ ≻ others, for some d,d′ ∈ D for some Dk−2 ⊆ D with
|Dk−2| = k− 2
⊲ Dk−2 ≻ d ≻ yj ≻ h(Cj, l2) ≻ d′ ≻ others, for some d,d′ ∈ D for some Dk−2 ⊆ D with
|Dk−2| = k− 2
⊲ Dk−2 ≻ d ≻ yj ≻ h(Cj, l3) ≻ d
′ ≻ others, for some d,d′ ∈ D for some Dk−2 ⊆ D with
|Dk−2| = k− 2
We now describe the preferences in P2. The price of every preference in P1 is 10mn.
(I) Dk−2 ≻ c ≻ d ≻ others, for some d ∈ D,Dk−2 ⊆ D with |Dk−2| = k − 2
(II) For every x ∈ {ai, a¯i,bi, b¯i,wi,w′i : i ∈ [n]}, we have 8 copies of the following preference.
⊲ Dk−2 ≻ x ≻ d ≻ others, for some d ∈ D,Dk−2 ⊆ D with |Dk−2| = k − 2
(III) For every x ∈ {yj : j ∈ [m]}, we have 7 copies of the following preference.
⊲ Dk−2 ≻ Dk−2 ≻ x ≻ d ≻ others, for some d ∈ D,Dk−2 ⊆ D with |Dk−2| = k − 2
The budget of the briber is (m + n). The value of δi for every voter i is 2. This finishes the description
of the (3,B2)-SAT instance. We now claim that the two instances are equivalent. In one direction, let the
(3,B2)-SAT instance be a YES instance with a satisfying assignment γ : {xi : i ∈ [n]} −→ {0, 1}. Let us consider
the following profile Q where the maximum displacement distance of every preference is at most 2 from its
corresponding preference in P.
(I) For every i ∈ [n], if γ(xi) = 1, then we have the following preferences.
⊲ wi ≻ w′i ≻ ai ≻ bi ≻ others
⊲ a¯i ≻ b¯i ≻ wi ≻ w′i ≻ others
(II) For every i ∈ [n], if γ(xi) = 0, then we have the following preferences.
⊲ ai ≻ bi ≻ wi ≻ w′i ≻ others
⊲ wi ≻ w′i ≻ a¯i ≻ b¯i ≻ others
(III) For every Cj = (l1 ∨ l2 ∨ l3) with j ∈ [m] and γ makes l1 = 1 (we can assume by renaming), then we
have the following preferences.
⊲ d ≻ h(Cj, l1) ≻ yj ≻ d′ ≻ others, for some d,d′ ∈ D
⊲ d ≻ yj ≻ h(Cj, l2) ≻ d′ ≻ others, for some d,d′ ∈ D
⊲ d ≻ yj ≻ h(Cj, l3) ≻ d′ ≻ others, for some d,d′ ∈ D
The preferences in P2 remain same in Q. Also since exactly (n +m) preferences in P1 change in Q, the
total prices of the preferences which are changed is B. Hence the LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED $BRIBERY
instance is a YES instance.
In the other direction, let us assume that there exists a profile Q such that the maximum displacement
distance of every preference in Q is at most 2 from its corresponding preference in P, c is the unique Borda
winner in Q, and the sum of the prices of the preferences which differ in P and Q is at most (m + n). We
first observe that the score of c in Q is the same as in P which is 10. Also since every alternative in D appears
within the first k + 10 positions at most once in P, no alternative in D can win in Q. Also since the budget
is (m + n) and the price of every preference in P2 is more than (m + n), no preference in P2 change in Q.
Let the preferences in Q which correspond to P1 be Q1. Hence, for c to win uniquely in Q, every alternative
in {ai, a¯i,bi, b¯i,wi,w
′
i : i ∈ [n]} can appear within the first k positions at most once in Q1. Also every
alternative in {yj : j ∈ [m]} can appear within the first k positions at most twice in Q1 for c to win uniquely.
Since the budget is (m+n) and the price of every preference in P1 is 1, for every i ∈ [n], there will be exactly
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one preference in Q1 where both wi and w
′
i appear within the first k positions and there will be exactly two
preferences in Q1 where yj appears within the first k positions for every j ∈ [m]. Let us now consider the
following assignment γ : {xi : i ∈ [n]} −→ {0, 1} defined as: γ(xi) = 0 if the preference in Q1 where both wi
and w′i appear within the first k positions has ai at the (k + 1)-th position; otherwise γ(xi) = 1. We claim
that γ is a satisfying assignment for the (3,B2)-SAT instance. Suppose not, then let us assume that γ does
not satisfy Cj = (l1 ∨ l2 ∨ l3) for some j ∈ [m]. We have already observed that, for c to become the unique
k-approval winner in Q, the alternative yj must move to its right by one position in at least one of the 3
preferences in P1 where it appears at the first position. However, it follows from the definition of γ that this
would make the k-approval score of at least one alternative in {f(l1), f(l2), f(l3)} same as the k-approval score
of c which contradicts our assumption that c is the unique winner in Q. Hence γ is a satisfying assignment
and thus the (3,B2)-SAT instance is a YES instance.
We next present our result for the Borda voting rule.
Theorem 11. The LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY problem is NP-complete for the Borda voting rule for
the swap and the maximum displacement distances even when δ = 1. Hence, the LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED
BRIBERY problem is NP-complete for the Borda voting rule for the footrule distance even when δ = 2.
Proof. Let us prove the result for the maximum displacement distance first. The LOCAL DISTANCE CON-
STRAINED BRIBERY problem for the Borda voting rule for the maximum displacement distance is clearly in
NP. To prove NP-hardness, we reduce from (3,B2)-SAT to LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY. Let
(X = {xi : i ∈ [n]},C = {Cj : j ∈ [m]}) be an arbitrary instance of (3,B2)-SAT. Let us consider the following
instance (A,P, c, δ = 1) of LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY.
A = {ai, a¯i, zi : i ∈ [n]}
∪ {c} ∪ {yj : j ∈ [m]}
∪D, where |D| = 10m7n7
We construct the profile P which is a disjoint union of two profiles, namely, P1 and P2. We first describe
P1 below. While describing the preferences below, whenever we say ‘others’ or ‘for some alternative in D’
or ‘for some subset of D’, the unspecified alternatives are assumed to be arranged in such a way that, for
every unspecified alternative a ∈ A \ D, at least 10 alternatives from D appear immediately before a. We
also ensure that any alternative in D appears within top 10m2n2 positions at most once in P1 whereas every
alternative in A \ D appears within top 10mn position in every preference in P1. This is always possible
because |D| = 10m7n7 whereas |A \D| = 3n+m+ 1 and |P1| = 2n+ 3m. Let f be a function defined on the
set of literals as f(xi) = ai and f(x¯i) = a¯i for every i ∈ [n].
(I) For every i ∈ [n], we have the following preferences.
⊲ zi ≻ ai ≻ d ≻ d′ ≻ c ≻ others, for some d,d′ ∈ D
⊲ zi ≻ a¯i ≻ d ≻ d′ ≻ c ≻ others, for some d,d′ ∈ D
(II) For every Cj = (l1 ∨ l2 ∨ l3) with j ∈ [m], we have the following preferences.
⊲ yj ≻ f(l1) ≻ d ≻ c ≻ others, for some d ∈ D
⊲ yj ≻ f(l2) ≻ d ≻ c ≻ others, for some d ∈ D
⊲ yj ≻ f(l3) ≻ d ≻ c ≻ others, for some d ∈ D
This finishes the description of P1. Let the function s1(·) maps every alternative in A to the Borda score
it receives from P1. We observe that s1 is integer valued and s1(c) is the unique maximum of s1 for large
enough n and m. We now describe the profile P2. Let N1 be the number of preferences in P1. While
describing the preferences in P2, we will leave the choice of alternatives in D unspecified. However, we
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assume that those choice are made in such a way that any alternative in D appears within the first 10mn
positions at most once in P2. This is always possible since |D| = 10m
7n7 and |P2| 6 10m
3n3. LetM = |A\D|;
we have M = 4n+m + 1.
(I) For every i ∈ [n], we have the following preferences.
⊲ s1(c) − s1(zi) + 2N1 − 2 preferences of type d0 ≻ d1 ≻ c ≻ b1 ≻ d2 ≻ b2 ≻ d3 ≻ · · · ≻ bM−2 ≻
dM−1 ≻ zi ≻ others, where A \ D = {c, zi} ∪ {bk : k ∈ [M− 2]} and dℓ ∈ D for 0 6 ℓ 6M− 1.
⊲ s1(c) − s1(zi) + 2N1 − 2 preferences of type zi ≻ d0 ≻ d1 ≻ bM−2 ≻ d2 ≻ · · · ≻ b1 ≻ dM−1 ≻
dM ≻ dM+1 ≻ c ≻ others, whereA\D = {c, zi}∪{bk : k ∈ [M−2]} and dℓ ∈ D for 0 6 ℓ 6M+1.
⊲ s1(c) − s1(ai) + 2N1 − 5 preferences of type d0 ≻ d1 ≻ c ≻ b1 ≻ d2 ≻ b2 ≻ d3 ≻ · · · ≻ bM−2 ≻
dM−1 ≻ ai ≻ others, where A \ D = {c,ai} ∪ {bk : k ∈ [M− 2]} and dℓ ∈ D for 0 6 ℓ 6M− 1.
⊲ s1(c) − s1(ai) + 2N1 − 5 preferences of type ai ≻ d0 ≻ d1 ≻ bM−2 ≻ d2 ≻ · · · ≻ b1 ≻ dM−1 ≻
dM ≻ dM+1 ≻ c ≻ others, whereA\D = {c,ai}∪{bk : k ∈ [M−2]} and dℓ ∈ D for 0 6 ℓ 6M+1.
⊲ s1(c) − s1(a¯i) + 2N1 − 5 preferences of type d0 ≻ d1 ≻ c ≻ b1 ≻ d2 ≻ b2 ≻ d3 ≻ · · · ≻ bM−2 ≻
dM−1 ≻ a¯i ≻ others, where A \ D = {c, a¯i} ∪ {bk : k ∈ [M− 2]} and dℓ ∈ D for 0 6 ℓ 6M− 1.
⊲ s1(c) − s1(a¯i) + 2N1 − 5 preferences of type a¯i ≻ d0 ≻ d1 ≻ bM−2 ≻ d2 ≻ · · · ≻ b1 ≻ dM−1 ≻
dM ≻ dM+1 ≻ c ≻ others, whereA\D = {c, a¯i}∪{bk : k ∈ [M−2]} and dℓ ∈ D for 0 6 ℓ 6M+1.
(II) For every j ∈ [m], we have the following preferences.
⊲ s1(c) − s1(yj) + 2N1 − 2 preferences of type d0 ≻ d1 ≻ c ≻ b1 ≻ d2 ≻ b2 ≻ d3 ≻ · · · ≻ bM−2 ≻
dM−1 ≻ yj ≻ others, where A \ D = {c,yj} ∪ {bk : k ∈ [M− 2]} and dℓ ∈ D for 0 6 ℓ 6M− 1.
⊲ s1(c) − s1(yj) + 2N1 − 2 preferences of type yj ≻ d0 ≻ d1 ≻ bM−2 ≻ d2 ≻ · · · ≻ b1 ≻ dM−1 ≻
dM ≻ dM+1 ≻ c ≻ others, whereA\D = {c,yj}∪{bk : k ∈ [M−2]} and dℓ ∈ D for 0 6 ℓ 6M+1.
This finishes the description of P2 and thus of P. Since s1(c) is upper bounded by 10m
7n7, P has only
polynomially (in m,n) many preferences. Let N2 = |P2| and N = |P| = N1 +N2. We summarize the Borda
scores of every alternative from P in Table 3. Let the function s(·) maps every alternative in A to the Borda
score it receives from P. We now claim that the two instance are equivalent.
Alternatives Borda scores from P
ai, a¯i∀i ∈ [n] s(c) + 2N− 5
zi, ∀i ∈ [n] s(c) + 2N− 2
yj, ∀j ∈ [m] s(c) + 2N− 2
d ∈ D < s(c) − 10m2n2
Table 3: Borda scores of the alternatives in A from P.
In one direction, let us assume that the (3,B2)-SAT instance is a YES instance. Let g : X −→ {0, 1}
be a satisfying assignment for the (3,B2)-SAT instance. Let us consider the following profile Q where the
maximum displacement distance of every preference in Q from its corresponding preference in P is at most
1. The preferences in Q which corresponds to P1 are as follows.
(I) For every i ∈ [n], we have the following preferences.
⊲ If g(xi) = 1, then
– zi ≻ d ≻ ai ≻ c ≻ d′ ≻ others, for some d,d′ ∈ D
– a¯i ≻ zi ≻ d ≻ c ≻ d
′ ≻ others, for some d,d′ ∈ D
⊲ Else
– ai ≻ zi ≻ d ≻ c ≻ d′ ≻ others, for some d,d′ ∈ D
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– zi ≻ d ≻ a¯i ≻ c ≻ d′ ≻ others, for some d,d′ ∈ D
(II) For every j ∈ [m], if Cj = (l1 ∨ l2 ∨ l3) and g makes l1 = 1 (we can assume by renaming), then we
have
⊲ f(l1) ≻ yj ≻ c ≻ d ≻ others, for some d ∈ D
⊲ yj ≻ f(l2) ≻ c ≻ d ≻ others, for some d ∈ D
⊲ yj ≻ f(l3) ≻ c ≻ d ≻ others, for some d ∈ D
In every preference in Q corresponding to P2, the alternative c is moved to its left by 1 position; it
is possible because c does not appear at the first position in any preference in P2. We also move every
alternative in A\ (D∪ {c}) to its right by 1 position; it is possible since no alternative in A\ (D∪ {c}) appears
at the last position in any preference in P2 and every alternative in A \ (D ∪ {c}) is followed immediately by
some alternative in D in every preference in P2. We summarize the Borda scores of every alternative from
Q in Table 4. Hence c is the unique Borda winner in Q and thus the LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY
instance is a YES instance.
Alternatives Borda scores from Q
ai, a¯i∀i ∈ [n] s(c) − 1
zi, ∀i ∈ [n] s(c) − 1
yj, ∀j ∈ [m] s(c) − 1
d ∈ D < s(c) − 10mn
Table 4: Borda scores of the alternatives in A from Q in the proof of Theorem 11.
In the other direction, let us assume that there exists a profile Q such that the maximum displacement
distance of every preference in Q is at most 1 from its corresponding preference in P and c is the unique
Borda winner in Q. We first observe that, irrespective of Q (subject to the condition that its maximum
displacement distance from P is at most 1), no alternative from D wins in Q under the Borda voting rule.
We can assume without loss of generality that, in every preference in Q, the alternative c is moved to its left
by 1 position since c never appears at the first position in any preference in P. We can also assume without
loss of generality that every alternative in A \ (D ∪ {c}) moves to its right by 1 position in every preference
corresponding to P2 since no alternative in A \ (D ∪ {c}) appears at the last position in any preference in P2
and every alternative in A \ (D ∪ {c}) is followed immediately by some alternative in D in every preference
in P2. We now observe that, for c to become the unique Borda winner in Q, every alternative zi, i ∈ [n]
must move to its right by one position in at least one of the two preferences in P1 where zi appears at the
first position (which are exactly the preferences in Item (I)). However, this makes either ai or a¯i, i ∈ [n] to
appear at the first position in at least one of the two preferences in P1 where zi appears at the first position.
Let us now consider the following assignment g : {xi : i ∈ [n]} −→ {0, 1} defined as: g(xi) = 0 if ai appears
at the first position in at least one of the two preferences in P1 where zi appears at the first position; we
define g(xi) = 1 otherwise. We claim that g is a satisfying assignment for the (3,B2)-SAT instance. Suppose
not, then let us assume that g does not satisfy Cj = (l1 ∨ l2 ∨ l3) for some j ∈ [m]. We observe that, for
c to become the unique Borda winner, the alternative yj must move to its right by one position in at least
one of the 3 preferences in P1 where it appears at the first position (which are exactly the preferences in
Item (II)). However, it follows from the definition of g that this would make the Borda score of at least one
alternative in {f(l1), f(l2), f(l3)} same as the Borda score of c which contradicts our assumption that c is the
unique Borda winner in Q. Hence g is a satisfying assignment and thus the (3,B2)-SAT instance is a YES
instance.
For proving the result for the swap and footrule distances, we change the preferences in P2 by shifting
every alternative in A\ (D∪ {c}) to their right by 1 position. Then analogous argument proves the result.
The proof of Theorem 11 can be adapted to prove the following result.
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Theorem 12. Let α = (αi)i∈[m] be a score vector with αj − αj+1 = αj+1 − αj+2 > 0 for some j ∈ [m/2]. The
LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY problem is NP-complete for the scoring rule with score vector α for the
swap and the maximum displacement distances even when δ = 1. Hence, the LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED
BRIBERY problem is NP-complete for the scoring rule with score vector α for the footrule distance even when
δ = 2.
We will use the following structural lemma in our proofs for the maximin and Copelandα voting rules.
Lemma 13. LetA = B∪C be a set of alternatives, Z(a,b),a,b ∈ B,a 6= b, non-negative integers which are either
all even or all odd, and Z(a,b) = −Z(b,a) for every a,b ∈ B,a 6= b. Let |C| > 10K
2|B|2
∑
a,b∈B,a 6=b |Z(a,b)|.
Then there exists a profile P such that
(i) DP(a,b) = Z(a,b) for every a,b ∈ B,a 6= b, DP(b
′, c′) > 0 for every b′ ∈ B, c′ ∈ C.
(ii) for every alternative b ∈ B, there are at least K/2 alternatives from C in the immediate K/2 positions on
both left and right of a.
(iii) For every c ∈ C, there exists at most 1 preference in P where the distance of c from any alternative in B is
less than K/2.
Moreover, P contains poly(
∑
a,b∈B,a 6=b |Z(a,b)|) many preferences, and there is an algorithm for constructing P
which runs in time polynomial in
∑
a,b∈B,a 6=b |Z(a,b)|+m.
Proof. Let |B| = ℓ,C =
⋃
a,b∈B,a 6=b C(a,b) where C(a,b)s are pairwise disjoint and |C(a,b)| > 4kℓ(|Z(a,b)| +
|Z(b,z)|) for every a,b ∈ B,a 6= b. First let us prove the result when Z(a,b),a,b ∈ B,a 6= b, are non-negative
integers which are either all even. For a,b ∈ B,a 6= b, let C(a,b) =
⋃2(|Z(a,b)|+|Z(b,z)|)
i=1 C
i
(a,b) where C
i
(a,b)s
are pairwise disjoint and |Ci(a,b)| > 2kℓ. For a,b ∈ B,a 6= b such that Z(a,b) > 0, we have the following
preferences. Let B = {bi : i ∈ [ℓ− 2]} ∪ {a,b}.
⊲ (Z(a,b))/2 copies of: a ≻ C1(a,b) ≻ b ≻ C
2
(a,b) ≻ b1 ≻ C
3
(a,b) ≻ . . . ≻ bℓ−2 ≻ C
ℓ
(a,b) · · ·
⊲ (Z(a,b))/2 copies of: bℓ−2 ≻ C
ℓ+1
(a,b)
≻ bℓ−3 ≻ C
ℓ+2
(a,b)
≻ · · · ≻ C2ℓ−1
(a,b)
≻ a ≻ C2ℓ(a,b) ≻ b ≻ · · ·
Let P be the resulting profile. It is immediate that P satisfies all the conditions in the statement. This
proves the statement when Z(a,b),a,b ∈ B,a 6= b, are non-negative integers which are either all even.
From the proof above, it follows that the statement holds even when |C| = 8K2|B|2
∑
a,b∈B,a 6=b |Z(a,b)|.
Let B = {bi : i ∈ [ℓ]}. Let C = C′ ∪ (
⋃ℓ
i=1 Ci) where |Ci| = 5K for every i ∈ [ℓ]. Let us consider the following
preference.
≻= b1 ≻ C1 ≻ b2 ≻ C2 ≻ · · · ≻ Cℓ−1 ≻ bℓ ≻ Cℓ ≻ · · ·
Let us define Z′ : B× B −→ Z as follows.
Z′(bi,bj) =
{
Z(bi,bj) + 1 if i > j
Z(bi,bj) − 1 otherwise
Let R be the profile which satisfies the conditions in the statement for the set of alternatives B ∪ C′ and
the integers Z′(a,b),a,b ∈ B,a 6= b. We append the alternatives in ∪
ℓ
i=1Ci at the bottom of every preference
in R; let the resulting profile be Q. Clearly, (Q,≻) satisfies all the conditions in the statement.
We now present our result for the maximin voting rule.
Theorem 14. The LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY problem is NP-complete for the maximin voting rule
for the swap distance and the maximum displacement distance even when δ = 1. Hence, the LOCAL DISTANCE
CONSTRAINED BRIBERY problem is NP-complete for the maximin voting rule for the footrule distance even when
δ = 2.
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Edges in weighted majority graph weight in P weight in Q Remark
(b, c) 10 10 Maximin score of c is −10 in P and Q
(wi,ai), (wi, a¯i)∀i ∈ [n] 8 12
Maximin scores of ai, a¯i, i ∈ [n] are −8 in P
Maximin scores of ai, a¯i, i ∈ [n] are −12 in Q
(ai, zi), (a¯i, zi)∀i ∈ [n] 8 − Maximin scores of zi, i ∈ [n] are −8 in P
If g(xi) = 1, then (a¯i, zi); else (ai, zi), i ∈ [n] − 12 Maximin score of zi is −12 in Q
∀j ∈ [m] if Cj = (l1 ∨ l2 ∨ l3), then
(f(lk),yj)∀k ∈ [3]
10 − Maximin score of yj is −10 in P
∀j ∈ [m] if Cj = (l1 ∨ l2 ∨ l3), then
(f(lk),yj) for some k ∈ [3]
− 12 Maximin score of yj is −12 in Q
(y1,b), (b,wi), ∀i ∈ [n] 12 12
Maximin scores of b,wi, i ∈ [n]
are −12 in P and Q
(a,d)∀a ∈ A \ D,d ∈ D 10mn 10mn Maximin score of d is −10mn in P and Q
Any edge not mentioned above 0 − Weights are same in both P and Q
Table 5: Weighted majority graph for P in Theorem 14.
Proof. Let us first prove the result for the swap distance. The LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY prob-
lem for the maximin voting rule for the swap distance is clearly in NP. To prove NP-hardness, we reduce
from (3,B2)-SAT to LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY. Let (X = {xi : i ∈ [n]},C = {Cj : j ∈ [m]}) be an
arbitrary instance of (3,B2)-SAT. Let us consider the following instance (A,P, c, δ = 1) of LOCAL DISTANCE
CONSTRAINED BRIBERY.
A = {ai, a¯i,wi, zi : i ∈ [n]} ∪ {yj : j ∈ [m]}
∪ {c,b} ∪D, where |D| = 10m5n5
We construct the profile P which is a disjoint union of two profiles, namely, P1 and P2. We first describe
P1 below. While describing the preferences below, whenever we say ‘others’ , the unspecified alternatives
are assumed to be arranged in such a way that, for every unspecified alternative a ∈ A\D, there are at least
10 alternatives from D in the immediate 10 positions on both left and right of a. We also ensure that any
alternative in D appears within top 10mn positions at most once in P1 whereas every alternative in A \ D
appears within top 10mn position in every preference in P1. This is possible because |D| = 10m
5n5 and
|A \ D| = 4n+m + 2. Let f be a function defined on the set of literals as f(xi) = ai and f(x¯i) = a¯i for every
i ∈ [n].
(I) For every i ∈ [n], we have the following preferences.
⊲ 2 copies of zi ≻ ai ≻ wi ≻ others
⊲ 2 copies of zi ≻ a¯i ≻ wi ≻ others
(II) For every Cj = (l1 ∨ l2 ∨ l3), j ∈ [m], we have the following preferences. Let h be a function defined
on the set of literals as h(xi) = wi and h(x¯i) = wi for every i ∈ [n].
⊲ yj ≻ f(l1) ≻ h(l1) ≻ others
⊲ yj ≻ f(l2) ≻ h(l2) ≻ others
⊲ yj ≻ f(l3) ≻ h(l3) ≻ others
Due to Lemma 13 (using K = 30 in Lemma 13), there exists a profile P2 consisting of poly(m,n) prefer-
ences such that the weighted majority graph of the profile P = P1 ∪ P2 is as described in Table 5. Moreover,
due to Lemma 13, in every preference in P2, for every alternative a ∈ A\D, there are at least 10 alternatives
fromD in the immediate 10 positions on both left and right of a, and the distance of every d ∈ D from every
a ∈ A \ D is less than 10 at most once in P2. This finishes the description of P. We now claim that the two
instances are equivalent.
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In one direction, let us assume that the (3,B2)-SAT instance is a YES instance with a satisfying assign-
ment g : X −→ {0, 1}. Let us consider the following profile Q where every preference is obtained from the
corresponding preference in P by performing at most 1 swap. The preferences in Q which corresponds to P1
are as follows.
(I) For every i ∈ [n], we have the following preferences.
⊲ If g(xi) = 1, then
– 2 copies of zi ≻ wi ≻ ai ≻ others
– 2 copies of a¯i ≻ zi ≻ wi ≻ others
⊲ Else
– 2 copies of ai ≻ zi ≻ wi ≻ others
– 2 copies of zi ≻ wi ≻ a¯i ≻ others
(II) For every j ∈ [m], if Cj = (l1 ∨ l2 ∨ l3) and g makes l1 = 1 (we can assume by renaming), then we
have
⊲ f(l1) ≻ yj ≻ h(l1) ≻ others
⊲ yj ≻ h(l2) ≻ f(l2) ≻ others
⊲ yj ≻ h(l3) ≻ f(l3) ≻ others
The preferences in P2 remain unchanged in P and Q. It can be verified that c is the unique maximin
winner in Q. We describe the weighted majority graph for Q in Table 5 which shows that c is the unique
maximin winner in Q.
In the other direction, let Q = Q1 ∪ Q2 be a profile where c is the unique maximin winner, the sub-profile
Qk corresponds to Pk for k ∈ [2], and every preference in Q is at most 1 swap away from its corresponding
preference in P. We begin with the observation that, since in every preference in Q, for every alternative
a ∈ A \ D, there are at least 10 alternatives from D in the immediate 10 positions on both left and right
of a and, for every alternative d ∈ D, there is at most two preferences in P2 where the distance of d from
any alternative in A \ D is at most 10, performing any one swap in any preference in P2 leaves the maximin
score of every alternative in A \ D unchanged. Also, it is clear that any alternative in D can never win by
performing at most one swap per preference in P. So, let us assume without loss of generality, that Q2 = P2.
Hence, the weighted majority graph of P1 ∪ Q2 is also as described in the second column of Table 5. Since,
there are at least 10 alternatives from D in the immediate 10 positions on both left and right of c in every
preference in P1, the maximin score of c is −10 in Q. Hence, for c to win uniquely, zi must be preferred over
either ai or a¯i in at least twice of the 4 preferences in P1 where zi appears at the first position. Let us now
consider the following assignment g : {xi : i ∈ [n]} −→ {0, 1} defined as: g(xi) = 0 if a¯i is preferred over
zi twice among the preferences in Q1 which correspond to the 4 preferences in P1 where zi appears at the
first position; otherwise g(xi) = 1. We claim that g is a satisfying assignment for the (3,B2)-SAT instance.
Suppose not, then let us assume that g does not satisfy Cj = (l1 ∨ l2 ∨ l3) for some j ∈ [m]. We first observe
that, since Cj is not satisfied, from the definition of g, for every k ∈ [3], the maximin score of f(lk) is −8 in
the profile Qk1 ∪ Q2, where Q
k
1 contains every preference in Q1 except the 2 preferences corresponding to the
preferences≻1,≻2 in P1 where f(lk) appears immediately after yt for some t ∈ [m] and contains ≻1 and ≻2.
Now, for c to win uniquely, there must exist a k ∈ [3] such that f(lk) is preferred over yj in at least one of the
three preferences in Q1 which corresponds to the 3 preferences corresponding to j. Let us assume without
loss of generality that f(l1) is preferred over yj in one of the three preferences in Q1 which corresponds to the
3 preferences corresponding to j. Then the maximin score of f(l1) in Q is at least −10 which contradicts our
assumption that c is the unique maximin winner in Q. Hence, g is a satisfying assignment for the (3,B2)-SAT
instance and thus the (3,B2)-SAT instance is a YES instance.
The exact same reduction and analogous proof proves the result for the footrule distance and the maxi-
mum displacement distance.
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We now prove the result for the Copelandα voting rule for any α ∈ [0, 1].
Theorem 15. Let α ∈ [0, 1]. Then the LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY problem is NP-complete for
the Copelandα voting rule for the swap distance and the maximum displacement distance even when δ = 1.
Hence, the LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY problem is NP-complete for the Copelandα voting rule for
the footrule distance even when δ = 2.
Proof. Let us first prove the result for the swap distance. The LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY prob-
lem for the Copelandα voting rule for the swap distance is clearly in NP. To prove NP-hardness, we reduce
from (3,B2)-SAT to LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY. Let (X = {xi : i ∈ [n]},C = {Cj : j ∈ [m]}) be an
arbitrary instance of (3,B2)-SAT. Let us consider the following instance (A,P, c, δ = 1) of LOCAL DISTANCE
CONSTRAINED BRIBERY.
A = {ai, a¯i, zi : i ∈ [n]}
∪ {c,w} ∪ {yj : j ∈ [m]} ∪D, where |D| = 10m
8n8
We construct the profile P which is a disjoint union of two profiles, namely, P1 and P2. We first describe
P1 below. While describing the preferences in P1, whenever we say ‘others’ or ‘for some alternative in D’ or
‘for some subset of D’, the unspecified alternatives are assumed to be arranged in such a way that, for every
unspecified alternative a ∈ A \D, there are at least 10 alternatives from D in the immediate 10 positions on
both left and right of a. We also ensure that any alternative in D appears within top 10mn positions at most
once in P1 whereas every alternative in A appears within top 10mn position in every preference in P1. This
is possible |D| = 10m8n8, |A \ D| = 3n +m + 2, and |P1| = 2n + 3m. Let f be a function defined on the set
of literals as f(xi) = ai and f(x¯i) = a¯i for every i ∈ [n].
(I) For every i ∈ [n], we have the following preferences.
⊲ zi ≻ ai ≻ w ≻ others
⊲ zi ≻ a¯i ≻ w ≻ others
(II) For every j ∈ [m] if Cj = (l1 ∨ l2 ∨ l3), we have the following preferences.
⊲ yj ≻ f(l1) ≻ others
⊲ yj ≻ f(l2) ≻ others
⊲ yj ≻ f(l3) ≻ others
Due to Lemma 13, there exists a profile P2 consisting of poly(m,n) preferences such that the weighted
majority graph G of the profile P = P1 ∪ P2 has the following properties. There is no tie in G. There exists a
positive integer N < |A| such that,
(i) For every i ∈ [n], ai and a¯i defeat exactly N−2 alternatives including w and lose against the remaining
alternatives.
(ii) For every Cj = (l1 ∨ l2 ∨ l3), j ∈ [m], then yj defeats exactly N alternatives including the alternatives
f(l1), f(l2), f(l3) and loses against the remaining alternatives.
(iii) For every i ∈ [n], zi defeats exactly N alternatives including the alternatives ai and a¯i for every i ∈ [n]
and loses against the remaining alternatives.
(iv) The alternative c defeats exactly N alternatives and loses against the remaining alternatives.
(v) The alternative w and every alternative in D defeat at most N − 1 alternatives and lose against the
remaining alternatives.
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(vi) The weight of all the edges described above is 10m3n3 + 1 except the following. The weight
of the edges (zi,ai), (zi, a¯i), (ai,w), (a¯i,w) are 1 for every i ∈ [n]. The weight of the edges
(yj, f(l1)), (yj, f(l2)), (yj, f(l3)) are 1 for every j ∈ [m] where Cj = (l1 ∨ l2 ∨ l3).
Moreover, due to Lemma 13 (using K = 30 in Lemma 13), in every preference in P2, for every alternative
a ∈ A \ D, there are at least 10 alternatives from D in the immediate 10 positions on both left and right of
a, and the distance of every d ∈ D from every a ∈ A \D is less than 10 at most once in P2. This finishes the
description of P. We now claim that the two instances are equivalent.
In one direction, let us assume that the (3,B2)-SAT instance is a YES instance with satisfying assignment
g : X −→ {0, 1}. Let us consider the following profile Q where every preference is obtained from the corre-
sponding preference in P by performing at most 1 swap. The preferences in Q which corresponds to P1 are
as follows.
(I) For every i ∈ [n], we have the following preferences.
⊲ If g(xi) = 1, then
– zi ≻ w ≻ ai ≻ others
– a¯i ≻ zi ≻ w ≻ others
⊲ Else
– ai ≻ zi ≻ w ≻ others
– zi ≻ w ≻ a¯i ≻ others
(II) For every j ∈ [m], if Cj = (l1 ∨ l2 ∨ l3) and g makes l1 = 1 (we can assume by renaming), then we
have
⊲ f(l1) ≻ yj ≻ others
⊲ yj ≻ h(l2) ≻ others
⊲ yj ≻ h(l3) ≻ others
The preferences in P2 remain unchanged in P and Q. We observe that the Copeland
α score of c is N
whereas the Copelandα score of every alternative is at most N − 1. Thus c is the unique Copelandα winner
in Q.
In the other direction, let Q = Q1∪Q2 be a profile where c is the unique Copelandα winner, the sub-profile
Qk corresponds to Pk for k ∈ [2], and every preference in Q is at most 1 swap away from its corresponding
preference in P. We begin with the observation that, due to the structure of P1 and P2 (from Lemma 13),
any change in any preference in P2 up to 1 swap, irrespective of Q1, leaves the Copeland
α score of every
alternative in A \ D unchanged. So we can assume without loss of generality that Q2 = P2. Since, for every
alternative a ∈ A \ D, there are at least 10 alternatives from D in the immediate 10 positions on both left
and right of a in every preference in P1, the weight of any edge incident on s in the weighted majority
graph is 10m3n3 + 1, and any alternative in A \ {c} follows immediately c in at most one preference in P,
the Copelandα score of c is N in Q. Hence, for c to win uniquely, zi must be preferred over either ai or
a¯i in at least 1 of the 2 preferences in P1 where zi appears at the first position. Let us now consider the
following assignment g : {xi : i ∈ [n]} −→ {0, 1} defined as: g(xi) = 1 if a¯i is preferred over zi once among
the preferences in Q1 which corresponds to the 2 preferences in P1 where zi appears at the first position;
otherwise g(xi) = 0. We claim that g is a satisfying assignment for the (3,B2)-SAT instance. Suppose not,
then let us assume that g does not satisfy Cj = (l1 ∨ l2 ∨ l3) for some j ∈ [m]. Let h be a function defined on
the set of literals as h(xi) = zi and h(x¯i) = zi for every i ∈ [n]. We first observe that, since Cj is not satisfied,
from the definition of g, for every k ∈ [3], the alternative f(lk) defeats h(lk) in Q. Hence, for c to become the
unique Copelandα winner in Q, f(lk) must lose to yj for every k ∈ [3]. However, this makes the Copelandα
score of yj in Q N which contradicts ous assumption that c is the unique Copeland
α winner in Q. Hence, g
is a satisfying assignment for the (3,B2)-SAT instance and thus the (3,B2)-SAT instance is a YES instance.
The exact same reduction and analogous proof proves the result for the footrule distance and the maxi-
mum displacement distance.
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Theorem 16. The LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY problem is NP-complete for the simplified Bucklin
voting rule for the swap distance even when δ = 2. Hence the LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY problem
is NP-complete for the simplified Bucklin voting rule for the footrule distance even when δ = 4.
Proof. The LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY problem for the simplified Bucklin voting rule for the
swap distance is clearly in NP. To prove NP-hardness, we reduce from (3,B2)-SAT to LOCAL DISTANCE
CONSTRAINED BRIBERY. Let (X = {xi : i ∈ [n]},C = {Cj : j ∈ [m]}) be an arbitrary instance of (3,B2)-SAT. Let
us consider the following instance (A,P, c, δ = 2) of LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY.
A = {a(xi, 0),a(xi, 1),a(x¯i, 0),a(x¯i, 1) : i ∈ [n]} ∪ {c,u}
∪ {wi : i ∈ [n]} ∪ {yj : j ∈ [m]} ∪D, where |D| = 10m
8n8
We construct the profile P using the following function f. The function f takes a literal and a clause as
input, and outputs a value in {0, 1,−}. For each literal l, let Ci and Cj with 1 6 i < j 6 m be the two
clauses where l appears. We define f(l,Ci) = 0, f(l,Cj) = 1, and f(l,Ck) = − for every k ∈ [m] \ {i, j}. This
finishes the description of the function f. We are now ready to describe P. While describing the preferences
below, whenever we say ‘others’ or ‘for some alternative in D’ or ‘for some subset of D’, the unspecified
alternatives are assumed to be arranged in such a way that, for every unspecified alternative a ∈ A \ D,
there are at least 10 alternatives from D in the immediate 10 positions on both left and right of a. We
also ensure that any alternative in D appears within top 10m2n2 positions at most once in P whereas every
alternative in A appears within top 10m2n2 position in every preference in P. This is possible because
|D| = 10m8n8, |A \ D| = 5n +m + 2, and |P| = 4n + 6m − 1. Let A0 = {a(xi, 0),a(x¯i, 0) : i ∈ [n]},A1 =
{a(xi, 1),a(x¯i, 1) : i ∈ [n]},W = {wi : i ∈ [n]}.
(I) For every i ∈ [n], we have
⊲ c ≻ Dmn−3 ≻ wi ≻ a(xi, 0) ≻ a(xi, 1) ≻ d ≻ others, for some d ∈ D and Dmn−3 ⊂ D with
|Dmn−3| = mn− 3
⊲ c ≻ Dmn−3 ≻ wi ≻ a(x¯i, 0) ≻ a(x¯i, 1) ≻ d ≻ others, for some d ∈ D and Dmn−3 ⊂ D with
|Dmn−3| = mn− 3
(II) For every j ∈ [m], if Cj = (l1 ∨ l2 ∨ l3), then we have
⊲ c ≻ Dmn−3 ≻ yj ≻ d ≻ a(l1, f(l1,Cj)) ≻ d′ ≻ others, for some d,d′ ∈ D and Dmn−3 ⊂ D with
|Dmn−3| = mn− 3
⊲ c ≻ Dmn−3 ≻ yj ≻ d ≻ a(l2, f(l2,Cj)) ≻ d′ ≻ others, for some d,d′ ∈ D and Dmn−3 ⊂ D with
|Dmn−3| = mn− 3
⊲ c ≻ Dmn−3 ≻ yj ≻ d ≻ a(l3, f(l3,Cj)) ≻ d′ ≻ others, for some d,d′ ∈ D and Dmn−3 ⊂ D with
|Dmn−3| = mn− 3
(III) A0 ≻ Dmn−2n+1 ≻ c ≻ others, for some Dmn−2n+1 ⊂ D with |Dmn−2n+1| = mn − 2n+ 1
(IV) (W ∪A0 ∪A1) ≻ Dmn ≻ others, for some Dmn ⊂ D with |Dmn| = mn
(V) 2n+ 3m− 3 copies: A ≻ D ≻ c
We now claim that the two instances are equivalent. In one direction, let us assume that the (3,B2)-SAT
instance is a YES instance with satisfying assignment g : X −→ {0, 1}. Let us consider the following profile Q
where every preference is obtained from the corresponding preference in P by performing at most 2 swaps.
(I) For every i ∈ [n], we have
⊲ If g(xi) = 1, then
– c ≻ Dmn−3 ≻ wi ≻ d ≻ a(xi, 0) ≻ a(xi, 1) ≻ others for some d ∈ D and Dmn−3 ⊂ D with
|Dmn−3| = mn− 3
20
– c ≻ Dmn−3 ≻ a(x¯i, 0) ≻ a(x¯i, 1) ≻ wi ≻ d ≻ others for some d ∈ D and Dmn−3 ⊂ D with
|Dmn−3| = mn− 3
⊲ Else
– c ≻ Dmn−3 ≻ a(xi, 0) ≻ a(xi, 1) ≻ wi ≻ d ≻ others for some d ∈ D and Dmn−3 ⊂ D with
|Dmn−3| = mn− 3
– c ≻ Dmn−3 ≻ wi ≻ d ≻ a(x¯i, 0) ≻ a(x¯i, 1) ≻ others for some d ∈ D and Dmn−3 ⊂ D with
|Dmn−3| = mn− 3
(II) For every j ∈ [m], if Cj = (l1 ∨ l2 ∨ l3) and g makes l1 = 1 (we can assume by renaming), then we
have
⊲ c ≻ Dmn−3 ≻ d ≻ a(l1, f(l1,Cj)) ≻ yj ≻ d
′ ≻ others for some d,d′ ∈ D and Dmn−3 ⊂ D with
|Dmn−3| = mn− 3
⊲ c ≻ Dmn−3 ≻ yj ≻ d ≻ a(l2, f(l2,Cj)) ≻ d′ ≻ others for some d,d′ ∈ D and Dmn−3 ⊂ D with
|Dmn−3| = mn− 3
⊲ c ≻ Dmn−3 ≻ yj ≻ d ≻ a(l3, f(l3,Cj)) ≻ d′ ≻ others for some d,d′ ∈ D and Dmn−3 ⊂ D with
|Dmn−3| = mn− 3
(III) A0 ≻ Dmn−2n−1 ≻ c ≻ others for some Dmn−2n+1 ⊂ D with |Dmn−2n−1| = mn − 2n− 1
(IV) (W ∪A0 ∪A1) ≻ Dmn · · · for some Dmn ⊂ D with |Dmn| = mn
(V) 2n+ 3m− 3 copies: A ≻ D ≻ c
Only the alternative c appears a majority number of times within the first mn positions in Q. Hence c is
the unique simplified Bucklin winner in Q and thus the LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY instance is a
YES instance.
In the other direction, let Q be a profile where c is the unique simplified Bucklin winner and every
preference in Q is at most 2 swaps away from its corresponding preference in P. We observe that in the
preference in Q which corresponds to Item (III), the alternative c moves to its left by 2 positions since
otherwise, irrespective of Q (subject to the condition that the swap distance of every preference in Q is at
most 2 from its corresponding preference in P), c does not appear within the firstmn positions in Q whereas
every alternative in W appears majority within the first mn + 1 positions contradicting our assumption that
c is the unique simplified Bucklin winner in Q. Hence, c appears a (2n + 3m) (which is a majority) number
of times within the first mn positions in Q and does not appear a majority number of times within the first
mn − 1 positions in Q. Now, since c is the unique simplified Bucklin winner in Q, no alternative other than
c appears a majority number of times within the first mn positions in Q. Since, every alternative wi ∈ W
appears (2n + 3m) number of times within the first mn − 1 positions in P, wi must be moved in Q to its
right by 2 positions in at least one of the two preferences in P where wi appears at position (mn − 1). We
now consider the following assignment g : X −→ {0, 1} – for every i ∈ [n], g(xi) = 0 if the preference in Q
corresponding to the preference c ≻ Dmn−3 ≻ wi ≻ a(xi, 0) ≻ a(xi, 1) ≻ d ≻ others in P moves wi to its
right by two positions; otherwise g(xi) = 1. We claim that g is a satisfying assignment for the (3,B2)-SAT
instance. Suppose not, then let us assume that g does not satisfy Cj = (l1 ∨ l2 ∨ l3) for some j ∈ [m]. We
first observe that yj also appears (2n + 3m) number of times within the first mn − 1 positions in P. Hence,
yj must be moved in Q to its right by 2 positions in at least one of the two preferences in P where yj appears
at position (mn − 1). However, this implies that at least one alternative in {a(li, f(li,Cj)) : i ∈ [3]} appears
at least (2n + 3m) times within the first mn positions in Q due to the definition of g. This contradicts our
assumption that c is the unique simplified Bucklin winner in Q. Hence g is a satisfying assignment and thus
the (3,B2)-SAT instance is a YES instance.
The proof for the footrule distance follows from the observation that, for any two preferences ≻1,≻2∈
L(A), if we have dfootrule(≻1,≻2) = 4, then we have dswap(≻1,≻2) = 2.
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Theorem 17. The LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED $BRIBERY problem is NP-complete for the simplified Bucklin
voting rule for the maximum displacement distance even when δi = 2 for every preference i.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 10.
Theorem 18. The LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY problem is NP-complete for the Bucklin voting rule
for the swap distance and maximum displacement distance even when δ = 1. Hence, The LOCAL DISTANCE
CONSTRAINED BRIBERY problem is NP-complete for the Bucklin voting rule for the footrule distance even when
δ = 2.
Proof. Let us first prove the result for the maximum displacement distance. The LOCAL DISTANCE CON-
STRAINED BRIBERY problem for the Bucklin voting rule for the maximum displacement distance is clearly
in NP. To prove NP-hardness, we reduce from (3,B2)-SAT to LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY. Let
(X = {xi : i ∈ [n]},C = {Cj : j ∈ [m]}) be an arbitrary instance of (3,B2)-SAT. Let us consider the following
instance (A,P, c, δ = 1) of LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY.
A = {ai, a¯i, zi : i ∈ [n]} ∪ {c}
∪ {yj, ej : j ∈ [m]} ∪D, where |D| = 10m
8n8
We construct the profile P using the following function f. The function f takes a literal and a clause as
input, and outputs a value in {0, 1,−}. For each literal l, let Ci and Cj with 1 6 i < j 6 m be the two
clauses where l appears. We define f(l,Ci) = 0, f(l,Cj) = 1, and f(l,Ck) = − for every k ∈ [m] \ {i, j}. This
finishes the description of the function f. We are now ready to describe P. While describing the preferences
below, whenever we say ‘others’ or ‘for some alternative in D’ or ‘for some subset of D’, the unspecified
alternatives are assumed to be arranged in such a way that, for every unspecified alternative a ∈ A \ D,
there are at least 10 alternatives from D in the immediate 10 positions on both left and right of a. We
also ensure that any alternative in D appears within top 10mn positions at most once in P whereas every
alternative in A appears within top 10m2n2 position in every preference in P. This is possible because
|D| = 10m8n8, |A \D| = 3n+ 2m+ 2, and |P| 6 10m3n3. Let h be a function defined on the set of literals as
h(xi) = ai and h(x¯i) = a¯i for every i ∈ [n]. Let k = 10(m + n) and N′ = 2n + 5m. For any integer s with
1 6 s 6 4, let Ys = {yj : j ∈ [m] and if Cj = (l1∨ l2 ∨ l3) and f(lr,Cj) = 0 for exactly s− 1many r ∈ {1, 2, 3}}.
The profile P is the disjoint union of two profiles P1 and P2. We first describe P1 below.
(I) For every i ∈ [n], we have
⊲ c ≻ Dk−3 ≻ zi ≻ ai ≻ others, for some Dk−3 ⊂ D with |Dk−3| = k − 3
⊲ c ≻ Dk−3 ≻ zi ≻ a¯i ≻ others, for some Dk−3 ⊂ D with |Dk−3| = k − 3
(II) For every j ∈ [m], if Cj = (l1 ∨ l2 ∨ l3), then we have
⊲ c ≻ Dk−3 ≻ yj ≻ ej ≻ others, for some Dk−3 ⊂ D with |Dk−3| = k− 3
⊲ c ≻ Dk−2 ≻ yj ≻ ej ≻ others, for some Dk−2 ⊂ D with |Dk−2| = k− 2
⊲ For every r ∈ [3]
If f(lr,Cj) = 0, then
c ≻ Dk−3 ≻ yj ≻ h(lr) ≻ others, for some Dk−3 ⊂ D with |Dk−3| = k − 3
Otherwise
c ≻ Dk−2 ≻ yj ≻ h(lr) ≻ others, for some Dk−2 ⊂ D with |Dk−2| = k − 2
(III) 5 copies: Dk ≻ c ≻ others, for some Dk ⊂ D with |Dk| = k
(IV) For every i ∈ [n]
⊲ N′ − 1 copies: Dk−3 ≻ zi ≻ others, for some Dk−3 ⊂ D with |Dk−3| = k− 3
⊲ N′ − 1 copies: Dk−3 ≻ ai ≻ others, for some Dk−3 ⊂ D with |Dk−3| = k − 3
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⊲ N′ − 1 copies: Dk−3 ≻ a¯i ≻ others, for some Dk−3 ⊂ D with |Dk−3| = k − 3
⊲ 3 copies: Dk−2 ≻ ai ≻ others, for some Dk−2 ⊂ D with |Dk−2| = k − 2
⊲ 3 copies: Dk−2 ≻ a¯i ≻ others, for some Dk−2 ⊂ D with |Dk−2| = k − 2
(V) For every j ∈ [m]
⊲ N′ + 3 copies: Dk−2 ≻ ej ≻ others, for some Dk−2 ⊂ D with |Dk−2| = k − 2
(VI) For every s ∈ [4], for every yj ∈ Ys
⊲ N′ − s + 1 copies: Dk−3 ≻ yj ≻ others, for some Dk−3 ⊂ D with |Dk−3| = k− 3
⊲ s − 1 copies: Dk−2 ≻ yj ≻ others, for some Dk−2 ⊂ D with |Dk−2| = k − 2
This finishes the description of P1. Let the number of preferences in P1 be N
′′. Let P2 be a profile
consisting of N′′ − 2N′ copies of (A \ D) ≻ D. This finishes the description of P2 and thus of P. Let N
denotes the total number of preferences in P. Then we have N = 2(N′′ − N′). We observe that N is an
even integer. This finishes the description of the reduced LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY instance.
Table 6 shows the number of times every alternative appears within the first k − 2, k − 1, k, and k + 1 times
in P.
Alternatives
Number of times it appears within first
k− 2 positions k− 1 positions k positions k+ 1 positions
c (N/2) (N/2) (N/2) (N/2) + 5
zi, i ∈ [n] (N/2) − 1 (N/2) + 1 (N/2) + 1 (N/2) + 1
ai, a¯i, i ∈ [n] (N/2) − 1 (N/2) + 2 (N/2) + 4 (N/2) + 5
yj,yj ∈ Ys, s ∈ [4] (N/2) − s + 1 (N/2) + s (N/2) + 5 (N/2) + 5
ej, j ∈ [m] 0 (N/2) + 3 (N/2) + 4 (N/2) + 5
d ∈ D 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1
Table 6: Number of times every alternative appears within first k − 2, k− 1, k, and k + 1 times in P.
We now claim that the two instances are equivalent. In one direction, let us assume that the (3,B2)-SAT
instance is a YES instance with satisfying assignment g : X −→ {0, 1}. Let us consider the following profile Q
where the maximum displacement distance of every preference in Q from its corresponding preference in P
is at most 1.
(I) For every i ∈ [n], we have
⊲ If g(xi) = 0, then
– c ≻ Dk−3 ≻ ai ≻ zi ≻ others, for some Dk−3 ⊂ D with |Dk−3| = k− 3
– c ≻ Dk−3 ≻ zi ≻ d ≻ a¯i ≻ others, for some d ∈ D,Dk−3 ⊂ D with |Dk−3| = k − 3
⊲ If g(xi) = 1, then
– c ≻ Dk−3 ≻ zi ≻ d ≻ ai ≻ others, for some d ∈ D,Dk−3 ⊂ D with |Dk−3| = k − 3
– c ≻ Dk−3 ≻ a¯i ≻ zi ≻ others, for some Dk−3 ⊂ D with |Dk−3| = k− 3
(II) For every j ∈ [m], if Cj = (l1 ∨ l2 ∨ l3), then we have
⊲ If there exists t ∈ [3] with f(lt,Cj) = 0 and g(lt) = 1, then
– c ≻ Dk−3 ≻ yj ≻ d ≻ ej ≻ others, for some d ∈ D,Dk−3 ⊂ D with |Dk−3| = k − 3
– c ≻ Dk−2 ≻ ej ≻ yj ≻ others, for some Dk−2 ⊂ D with |Dk−2| = k − 2
– c ≻ Dk−3 ≻ h(lt) ≻ yj ≻ others, for some Dk−3 ⊂ D with |Dk−3| = k− 3
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– For every r ∈ [3], r 6= t
If f(lr,Cj) = 0, then
c ≻ Dk−3 ≻ yj ≻ h(lr) ≻ others, for some Dk−3 ⊂ D with |Dk−3| = k− 3
Otherwise
c ≻ Dk−2 ≻ yj ≻ h(lr) ≻ others, for some Dk−2 ⊂ D with |Dk−2| = k− 2
⊲ If there exists t ∈ [3] with f(lt,Cj) = 1 and g(lt) = 1, then
– c ≻ Dk−3 ≻ ej ≻ yj ≻ others, for some Dk−3 ⊂ D with |Dk−3| = k − 3
– c ≻ Dk−2 ≻ yj ≻ ej ≻ others, for some Dk−2 ⊂ D with |Dk−2| = k − 2
– c ≻ Dk−2 ≻ h(lt) ≻ yj ≻ others, for some Dk−2 ⊂ D with |Dk−2| = k− 2
– For every r ∈ [3], r 6= t
If f(lr,Cj) = 0, then
c ≻ Dk−3 ≻ yj ≻ h(lr) ≻ others, for some Dk−3 ⊂ D with |Dk−3| = k− 3
Otherwise
c ≻ Dk−2 ≻ yj ≻ h(lr) ≻ others, for some Dk−2 ⊂ D with |Dk−2| = k− 2
(III) 5 copies: Dk−1 ≻ c ≻ others, for some Dk−1 ⊂ D with |Dk−1| = k − 1
(IV) For every i ∈ [n]
⊲ N′ − 1 copies: Dk−2 ≻ zi ≻ others, for some Dk−2 ⊂ D with |Dk−2| = k− 2
⊲ N′ − 1 copies: Dk−2 ≻ ai ≻ others, for some Dk−2 ⊂ D with |Dk−2| = k − 2
⊲ N′ − 1 copies: Dk−2 ≻ a¯i ≻ others, for some Dk−2 ⊂ D with |Dk−2| = k − 2
⊲ 3 copies: Dk−1 ≻ ai ≻ others, for some Dk−1 ⊂ D with |Dk−1| = k − 1
⊲ 3 copies: Dk−1 ≻ a¯i ≻ others, for some Dk−1 ⊂ D with |Dk−1| = k − 1
(V) For every j ∈ [m]
⊲ N′ + 3 copies: Dk−1 ≻ ej ≻ others, for some Dk−1 ⊂ D with |Dk−1| = k − 1
(VI) For every s ∈ [4], for every yj ∈ Ys
⊲ N′ − s + 1 copies: Dk−2 ≻ yj ≻ others, for some Dk−2 ⊂ D with |Dk−2| = k− 2
⊲ s − 1 copies: Dk−1 ≻ yj ≻ others, for some Dk−1 ⊂ D with |Dk−1| = k − 1
Table 7 shows the number of times every alternative appears within the first k−1 and k times in Q which
proves that c is the unique Bucklin winner in Q and thus the LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY instance
is a YES instance.
Alternatives
Number of times it appears within first
k − 1 positions k positions
c (N/2) (N/2) + 5
zi, i ∈ [n] (N/2) (N/2) + 1
ai, a¯i, i ∈ [n] 6 (N/2) 6 (N/2) + 4
yj, j ∈ [m] (N/2) (N/2) + 4
ej, j ∈ [m] 6 1 (N/2) + 4
d ∈ D 6 1 6 1
Table 7: Number of times every alternative appears within first k−1 and k times in Q in the forward direction
of the proof of Theorem 18.
In the other direction, let us assume that there exists a profile Q such that the maximum displacement
distance of every preference in Q is at most 1 from its corresponding preference in P and c is the unique
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Bucklin winner in Q. We first observe that, irrespective of Q (subject to the condition that its maximum
displacement distance from P is at most 1), any alternative in D does not appear a majority number of times
within the first 2k positions in Q. Nest we can assume without loss of generality that in the preference in
Q which corresponds to Item (III), the alternative c moves to its left by 1 position since any alternative to
the left of c in Item (III) belongs to D. Since in any preference in Q other than Item (III), c never appears
in any position in {ℓ ∈ N : k − 3 6 ℓ 6 k + 3}, c does not appear a majority number of times within the
first k − 1 positions (it actually appears (N/2) times) in Q. However, c appears within the first k positions
(N/2) + 5 times in Q. Since, in every preference in Items (IV) to (VI), every alternative in A \ D has at least
10 alternatives from D in its immediate left and right, we can assume without loss of generality that every
alternative in A \ (D ∪ {c}) moves to its right by 1 position in every preference in Q corresponding to the
preferences in Items (IV) to (VI). Now the alternative zi, i ∈ [n] appears (N/2) + 1 times within the first k− 1
positions, yj, j ∈ [m] appears (N/2) + 1 and (N/2) + 5 times within the first k− 1 and k positions respectively,
ai, a¯i, i ∈ [n] appear (N/2) − 1 and (N/2) + 4 times within the first k − 1 and k positions respectively, and
ej, j ∈ [m] appears 1 and (N/2)+ 4 times within the first k− 1 and k positions. We now observe that there are
exactly two preferences in Pwhere zi appears at the (k−1)-th position. Hence, for c to be the unique Bucklin
winner in Q, zi must move to its right by 1 position in at least one preference among the two preferences
in P where it appears at (k − 1)-th position. We now consider the following assignment g : X −→ {0, 1} –
for every i ∈ [n], g(xi) = 0 if there exists a preference in Q where zi appears at the k-th position and ai
appears at the (k − 1)-th position; otherwise we define g(xi) = 1. We claim that g is a satisfying assignment
for the (3,B2)-SAT instance. Suppose not, then let us assume that g does not satisfy Cj = (l1 ∨ l2 ∨ l3)
for some j ∈ [m]. Suppose yj ∈ Ys for some s ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Then, among the 5 preferences in Item (II)
corresponding to yj (let us call them Qj and Pj respectively in Q and in P), the alternative yj appears s times
at the (k − 1)-th position and 5 − s times at the k-th position. Now it follows from the definition of g that
every alternative in {h(l1),h(l2),h(l3)} appears (N/2) and (N/2)+4 times within the first k−1 and k positions
in (Q\Qj)∪Pj and thus cannot move to their left in any preference in Pj. Now, to make c the unique Bucklin
winner of Q, the alternative yj must move to its right by one position each in at least one preferences where
it appears at the (k− 1)-th position and where it appears at the k-th position. Hence, ej must move to its left
in both the preferences in Pj where it appears at the immediate right of yj. However, this makes ej appear
(N/2) + 5 times within the first k preferences in Q which contradicts our assumption that c is the unique
Bucklin winner in Q. Hence g is a satisfying assignment and thus the (3,B2)-SAT instance is a YES instance.
Now the result for the swap and footrule distances also follow from the analogous reductions from
(3,B2)-SAT.
5 Conclusion and Future Direction
In this paper, we have proposed a new model of bribery. We have argued that the bribery models studied
so far in computational social choice may fail to capture intricacies in certain situations, for example, where
there is a fear of information leakage and voters care about social reputation. We have discussed how our
LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED $BRIBERY and LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY problems can suitably
model those scenarios. We have then shown that the LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED $BRIBERY problem
is polynomial time solvable for the plurality and veto voting rules for the swap, footrule, and maximum
displacement distances, and for the k-approval voting rule for the swap distance if the distance allowed
is 1 (and thus for the footrule distance, it is 3). For the k-approval and simplified Bucklin voting rules
for the maximum displacement distance, we have shown that the LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY
problem is polynomial time solvable. We have then proved that the LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY
problem (and thus the LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED $BRIBERY problem) is NP-complete for the k-approval
and simplified Bucklin voting rules for the swap distance even if the distance allowed is 2 (and thus for
the footrule distance, it is 4), for a class of scoring rules which includes the Borda voting rule, maximin,
Copelandα for any α ∈ [0, 1], and Bucklin voting rules for the swap and maximum displacement distances
even when the distance allowed is 1 (and thus for the footrule distance, it is 3). In particular, we have
proved tight (in terms of δ) computational complexity results for the LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY
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problem for the swap, footrule, and maximum displacement distances. Our results show that the notion
of optimality makes bribery much richer than optimal manipulation in the sense that the complexity of
the LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY problem for some commonly used voting rule (k-approval for
example) can change drastically if we change the measure of distance under consideration.
It would be interesting to find approximation algorithms for the LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY
problem where it is NP-complete (our hardness proofs already show APX-hardness). The bribery problem
in this paper can be extended by introducing a pricing model and a (global) budget for the briber which
the briber needs to respect. In any setting where our LOCAL DISTANCE CONSTRAINED BRIBERY problem is
NP-complete, hardness in such sophisticated models in the corresponding setting will immediately follow.
However, it would be interesting to extend our polynomial time algorithms to those sophisticated models.
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